What are Feeds?
Anti-Terror Fence a Success
May 04, 2007
The much contested “anti-terror” fence under construction in Israel is producing the desired impact of reducing the number of suicide bombers reaching Israeli population centers. Since Israel began constructing the fence, suicide bombings have dropped 90% and the growing complaint among captured suicide bombers is that they can no longer reach their targets because of the anti-terror fence.
Captain Rutland of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has seen a sharp decrease in the number of successful suicide attacks and a meteoric rise in the apprehension of would be suicide bombers since the beginning of the fence building project. There were on average 26 terrorist attacks a year prior to the construction of the fence and now there are only 3 attacks per year and those are perpetrated primarily from the areas where the fence has yet to be completed. An average of 103 people a year was killed from terror attacks before the fence compared with 28 people a year after the fence. Similar figures follow the same trend for the wounded, 688 wounded prior to the fence compared to 83 after the fence. These figures do not include the most recent two years where the number of wounded and killed from terror attacks has dwindled even further. According to the IDF, the anti-terror fence is the primary reason for such staggering reduction in Israeli loss of life.
The anti-terror fence is a physical barrier made of various materials and designs. 96% of the anti-terror fence is an actual chain link fence with electronic motion sensors extending from the top of the fence. The fence is monitored by IDF forces from observation towers and video surveillance equipment.
There are several layers of security employed with the chain link fence which a would-be bomber must navigate in order to reach Israeli civilians. He must first climb over a pyramid of razor wire approximately 5 feet high, and then scale a 6 feet deep ditch that is 6 feet wide and climb back up the other side. He must then cross a dirt patrol road that doubles as an intrusion detection surface (Soft sandy dirt that readily shows foot prints). At this point he actually reaches the 8 foot high chain link fence with 3 feet of sensor wire extending the complete height to 11 feet. If he successfully scales the 11 foot barrier without being seen from an observation post or being caught on video by cameras activated by the slightest motion on the fence, he must cross another dirt road/intrusion detection surface. He now only has one obstacle left: a paved patrol road with heavily armed IDF soldiers passing his position every few minutes. If he manages not to get caught initially, he has less than three minutes to vacate the area and flee from the IDF who are now aware of his presence. It is not by accident that the terrorist arrest rate has skyrocketed and the success rate of terrorists has plummeted.
Concrete barriers are also employed by the IDF in special situations. Only 4% of the anti-terror fence is an actual concrete wall. The wall is 24 feet tall and is accompanied by an adjacent patrol road. The concrete barriers are only used in two specific situations: (1) If sniper fire is frequent in the area or (2) in densely populated areas where land is scarce. Many highways are protected by concrete barriers instead of the chain link fence because snipers would routinely fire at vehicles traveling through Israel. Israeli drivers are now protected from the sniper threat as well as from rock throwing incidents because of the large barrier. In certain Israeli cities including Jerusalem the concrete barrier is used because the width of the concrete barrier is much less than that of the chain link fence scenario. When the chain link fence is used, it requires a width of land of about 150 feet. This is not feasible between most neighborhoods in densely populated areas like Jerusalem.
Although the fence is not completely finished, it has tremendously hampered the terrorist’s prospects of reaching Israeli citizens. When completed, the IDF anticipates this anti-terror fence to be 100% effective against terror threats.
According to IDF Captain Rutland, “the anti-terror fence is a huge success!”
Captain Rutland of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has seen a sharp decrease in the number of successful suicide attacks and a meteoric rise in the apprehension of would be suicide bombers since the beginning of the fence building project. There were on average 26 terrorist attacks a year prior to the construction of the fence and now there are only 3 attacks per year and those are perpetrated primarily from the areas where the fence has yet to be completed. An average of 103 people a year was killed from terror attacks before the fence compared with 28 people a year after the fence. Similar figures follow the same trend for the wounded, 688 wounded prior to the fence compared to 83 after the fence. These figures do not include the most recent two years where the number of wounded and killed from terror attacks has dwindled even further. According to the IDF, the anti-terror fence is the primary reason for such staggering reduction in Israeli loss of life.
The anti-terror fence is a physical barrier made of various materials and designs. 96% of the anti-terror fence is an actual chain link fence with electronic motion sensors extending from the top of the fence. The fence is monitored by IDF forces from observation towers and video surveillance equipment.
There are several layers of security employed with the chain link fence which a would-be bomber must navigate in order to reach Israeli civilians. He must first climb over a pyramid of razor wire approximately 5 feet high, and then scale a 6 feet deep ditch that is 6 feet wide and climb back up the other side. He must then cross a dirt patrol road that doubles as an intrusion detection surface (Soft sandy dirt that readily shows foot prints). At this point he actually reaches the 8 foot high chain link fence with 3 feet of sensor wire extending the complete height to 11 feet. If he successfully scales the 11 foot barrier without being seen from an observation post or being caught on video by cameras activated by the slightest motion on the fence, he must cross another dirt road/intrusion detection surface. He now only has one obstacle left: a paved patrol road with heavily armed IDF soldiers passing his position every few minutes. If he manages not to get caught initially, he has less than three minutes to vacate the area and flee from the IDF who are now aware of his presence. It is not by accident that the terrorist arrest rate has skyrocketed and the success rate of terrorists has plummeted.
Concrete barriers are also employed by the IDF in special situations. Only 4% of the anti-terror fence is an actual concrete wall. The wall is 24 feet tall and is accompanied by an adjacent patrol road. The concrete barriers are only used in two specific situations: (1) If sniper fire is frequent in the area or (2) in densely populated areas where land is scarce. Many highways are protected by concrete barriers instead of the chain link fence because snipers would routinely fire at vehicles traveling through Israel. Israeli drivers are now protected from the sniper threat as well as from rock throwing incidents because of the large barrier. In certain Israeli cities including Jerusalem the concrete barrier is used because the width of the concrete barrier is much less than that of the chain link fence scenario. When the chain link fence is used, it requires a width of land of about 150 feet. This is not feasible between most neighborhoods in densely populated areas like Jerusalem.
Although the fence is not completely finished, it has tremendously hampered the terrorist’s prospects of reaching Israeli citizens. When completed, the IDF anticipates this anti-terror fence to be 100% effective against terror threats.
According to IDF Captain Rutland, “the anti-terror fence is a huge success!”
