By: -Col. Bob Maginnis

Saudi Arabia controls the world’s largest oil reserves, and if that spigot is shut off by Mideast chaos, the global economy could be devastated. That is why the West must encourage the Saudis to mitigate their vulnerabilities, but be prepared to respond if the kingdom falls.

The Saudi monarchy is preparing for the worst case. For the first time last week, a Saudi youth group connected with others by social media to plan a peaceful demonstration in Jeddah expressing solidarity with anti-government protesters in Libya. Fortunately for Riyadh, that demonstration and another among Shiite citizens in the Eastern province weren’t violent like the protests in Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen.

But Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz’s perception of the growing threat of social unrest prompted him to throw money at the problem. Last week he announced a $37 billion benefits package to create 1,200 new jobs, raise cost-of-living allowances, grant interest-free home loans, and more.

The king should be concerned about the spreading unrest because Saudi Arabia has striking similarities with countries already racked by chaos. For example, the king runs Saudi Arabia with the same autocratic style that former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak used, and the Saudi monarchy bases its political system on family and tribal links, as in Yemen.

But these similarities are somewhat mitigated by Saudi differences. Much of the discontent expressed in neighboring countries is attributed to high unemployment and living costs, which the Saudis address by shoveling money at their difficulties.

Saudi Arabia is also different because it is a country of tribes connected by marriage, creating a land unified by family ties. Also, the House of Saud, the ruling family, is not the typical isolated monarchy. Rather, it has 30,000 members, including thousands of princes who are integrated throughout society.

The House of Saud also has a very unique relationship with the country’s religious leaders. The 18th century Saudi ruler Abdallah bin Muhammad bin Saud married his son Abdul Aziz to the daughter of Shaikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the puritanical Wahhabi movement. That union created the First Saudi State and explains the royal family’s advocacy for both Salafi Islam and unification of Saudi Arabia.

But these distinctives may not vaccinate the monarchy from four vulnerabilities.

First, the House of Saud is vulnerable because it hoards wealth and governing power. Saudi citizens are growing angry with their government as the population expands, per capita income drops, and young people lust for more liberty. That discontent is feeding a groundswell of calls for jihad against the royal family.

The rage and regional chaos may collide to form a tipping point for the kingdom. The monarch and his top princes are very old, and new blood must be installed. That reshuffling will remind anxious Saudis of Mubarak, who tried but failed to install his son as president. Saudis will ask themselves, too, why they must tolerate dictators.

Saudi citizens are also understandably impatient after having submitted petitions calling for a constitutional monarchy—a form of government in which the monarch acts as head of state within the parameters of a constitution. Calls for a constitutional monarchy and the kingdom’s pending leadership shuffle could become the tipping point that ends the House of Saud’s dynasty.

Second, the regime is vulnerable because it fails to treat political reform seriously. Last week Prince Alwaleed bin Talal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, a grandson of the founding king of Saudi Arabia, wrote in the New York Times, “Unless many Arab governments adopt radically different policies, their countries will very likely experience more political and civil unrest.”

He labeled Arab political systems “outmoded and brittle” and said, “Arab governments can no longer afford to take their populations for granted, or to assume that they will remain static and subdued.” But Saudi Arabia’s monarch is only half listening to reformers.

Saudi King Abdullah responded to calls for reform by instituting a “National Dialogue” process, which allegedly provides Saudi citizens the means to criticize their government. But some citizens who used the process to identify grievances were arrested and detained, creating doubt about the royal family’s reform commitment.

Similarly, in 2005 the Saudi monarchy hosted elections for municipal councils, which were granted nominal powers to oversee local governments and make recommendations to national leaders. But as with the National Dialogue process, the municipal councils were ignored or not sufficiently empowered to do their jobs.

Third, the regime is vulnerable because social reform could fracture the stabilizing monarchy-Wahhabi relationship. The Saudi monarchy maintains its legitimacy among conservative constituent groups by carefully managing changes that could affect established religious practices, even though the lack of change stifles democratic reform.

The Congressional Research Service’s 2010 report on Saudi Arabia states, “Since 2006, significant public debates have occurred on social issues such as the powers of religious police, education reform proposals, and the roles and rights of women and the integration of Shiites into Saudi Arabia’s predominantly Sunni society.” Wahhabi clerics oversee these issues, and any challenge to that authority could split the unique state-religion relationship, which might radicalize the Saudi clerics who allegedly support terror groups such as al-Qaeda.

Finally, the rise of Iran and its Arab Shiite allies is a Saudi vulnerability. King Abdullah believes Iran stirs up Saudi’s Shia minority—15% of the population—much as it is said to be doing in next-door Bahrain.

Last week King Abdullah met with the king of Bahrain, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, to discuss the Shia political uprising there. These Sunni leaders accuse their Shiite populations of loyalty to Iran, a charge Shiites say is used to stoke sectarian tensions and justify opposition to democracy.

But Saudis feel threatened because they are encircled by Shia-leaning governments—Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and possibly soon Bahrain. Alireza Nader, an expert in international affairs, told the New York Times, “They worry that the region is ripe for Iranian exploitation. Iran has shown that it is very capable of taking advantage of regional instability.”

There is a history of tensions among Saudi Shiites. Two years ago, Saudi police launched a search for Shiite preacher Nimr al-Nimr, who suggested in a sermon that Shiites could one day form their own separate state. That secessionist threat followed clashes between the Sunni religious police and Shiite pilgrims near the tomb of Prophet Muhammad in Medina.

The Saudi Shia last rose up in mass civil disobedience in the intifada of 1979, inspired by Iran’s Islamic revolution. Recently, Tehran openly endorsed the “rightful demands” of the Arab protest movement, which supports the Saudi view that Iran is attempting to create a Mideast “Shia Crescent” to become the hegemonic force in global oil.

The Saudi royals can avoid collapse by mitigating vulnerabilities. But if the monarchy falls, the West must be prepared to step in, militarily and otherwise, to stabilize the country, keep Iran at bay, and sustain the oil flowing.

By: -Col. Bob Maginnis

Bahrain, a Persian Gulf island nation, has been swept up in the pro-democracy protests parading across the Mideast. But Bahrain’s protests are different because of Iran’s influence.

A democratic outcome from the current crisis could land Bahrain under the thumb of Shia Islamists aligned with Iran. Tehran would use that influence to close America’s military facilities in Bahrain, expand its reach by instigating rebellion among Saudi Shia, and leverage the global oil market.

This would put Tehran in the catbird seat as the region’s uncontested hegemon.

Bahrain’s pro-democracy crisis started with crowds of Shiite Muslims seeking reforms in a country ruled by a Sunni royal family. The protesters demanded the monarchy give up control over top government posts to allow Shia political representation proportional to their numbers. Bahrain is 70% Shia.

Bahrain’s military responded with brutal force. Last Thursday, Bahraini soldiers used teargas, rubber bullets, and buckshot to clear Shiite protesters from Pearl Square in Manama, the capital city. Shiite protesters retook Pearl Square on Feb. 19 after the military withdrew, but the opposition has yet to accept the monarchy’s plea for dialogue.

This crisis dates back to last summer, when government agents arrested scores of Shiite activists before parliamentary elections. But even with the harassment, the main Shiite faction, an Islamist group called Al Wefaq (Accord), won 18 of the 40 seats in the lower house. Those members walked out of parliament after the government attacked the protesters last week.

Iran’s role in the current crisis is unconfirmed. However, Tehran’s history is intertwined with Bahrain’s, and it has a motive. The nations maintain cultural, religious, and economic ties, and Persian (Farsi) is widely spoken in Bahrain.

For more than a century, Iran and Bahrain disputed over Bahrain’s sovereignty, until a 1970 survey determined that Bahrainis overwhelmingly desired independence. That decision was embraced by Iran’s Shah and ratified by Iran’s parliament, but suspicions still linger.

Bahraini officials suspect Iran wants to reclaim sovereignty. Twice (1981 and 1996) Bahrain accused Iran of trying to organize a coup by pro-Iranian Bahraini Shiites. Also, Iranian media and political leaders consistently claim Bahrain should never have become formally independent of Iran.

Two years ago the former Iranian parliament speaker Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri described as “inspector general” in the office of Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei (the Ayatollah), complained that under the Shah, “Bahrain was our 14th province and had a representative at the parliament,” according to the international Arabic daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi.

Houda Nonoo, Bahrain’s U.S. ambassador, said, “Iran has had claims in the past on Bahrain.” She said the 2009 claim was “very similar to [Saddam Hussein’s] Iraq mentioning Kuwait as their 19th province,” according to the Washington Times.

There is recent evidence of Iranian involvement from the U.S. intelligence think tank Stratfor. It cites diplomatic sources that claim Lebanese Shia living in the United Arab Emirates entered Bahrain to participate in demonstrations. Also, Bahraini authorities reported arresting Lebanese Hezbollah—read Iranian proxies—in Pearl Square last week, and a different Stratfor source said roughly 100 Hezbollah operatives entered the United Arab Emirates beginning in January.

Whether Iran seeks to reclaim Bahrain and/or is stoking unrest via proxies is unconfirmed. But it is clear Tehran has exercised similar influence in Lebanon and Iraq. And it is also clear Iran would benefit if the current crisis results in a Shia-controlled Bahrain.

First, Iran would use a Bahrain platform to destabilize neighbor Saudi Arabia by instigating unrest among its Shia population. That could disrupt the flow of oil and/or radically alter the kingdom’s government and the region’s balance of power.

Riyadh sees Iran’s hand in Shiite empowerment in Baghdad and Beirut, and anticipates the same potential among its Shiite minority in the kingdom’s oil-rich eastern province. It fears the Saudi Shia, which make up 30% of the kingdom’s population, could rise up to demand reform—or at least share power—much as the Shia in Bahrain.

Last month, Saudi King Abdullah rebuked President Obama for insisting the Egypt crisis was not a homegrown uprising, but the result of Iranian interference. That is why the king will do everything possible to help Bahrain resist the Shia uprising, and should it come to Riyadh, the king won’t hesitate to use force. Stratfor’s sources indicate Saudi special operations forces are already in Bahrain helping put down the unrest.

Second, Iran would boot American forces out of Bahrain and replace them with its Revolutionary Guard forces. Tehran uses the Revolutionary Guard in Lebanon to train terrorist proxy Hezbollah and in Iraq to empower Shia power broker cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s insurgent Mahdi Army.

The 60-year-old U.S.-Bahrain relationship, which is built around defense issues, would end if an Iran-favoring government takes power. For now, Bahrain relies on U.S. security guarantees, and in exchange American forces enjoy access to air and naval facilities for the Fifth Fleet, which controls two carrier battle groups, monitors strategic passages such as the Strait of Hormuz, and tracks Iran’s navies—the Iranian fleet and the Revolutionary Guard’s navy.

Finally, Iran would threaten the flow of Persian Gulf oil if it had its way in Bahrain. Manama is not a major oil producer, but it does share with Saudi Arabia the 300,000 barrels per day exported from the offshore Abu Safa field.

But the real threat is Iran’s aim to leverage all Persian Gulf oil production. Iran already owns the world’s third-largest oil reserves, followed by fourth-place Iraq. Baghdad’s Shia-controlled government is in lockstep with Tehran and will soon be free of American forces, and therefore more vulnerable to Tehran’s influence.

Saudi Arabia has the world’s largest oil reserves, which Iran would like to control as well. A pro-Iran Bahrain would provide Tehran a platform from which to seed Saudi Shia insurrection much as it did in Iraq. No telling what might happen if Saudi Shiites sitting atop the kingdom’s oil fields cooperate with Iranian agents.

Bahrain would also provide Iran access to transit channels for oil tankers leaving Saudi Arabia’s loading facilities. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard navy could use that access to create coastal minefields—a capability it possesses—to control shipments, or soldiers could sabotage ships, as in a terrorist group’s attack on a Japanese oil tanker last summer. Both ways, the effect is to slow exports, making crude oil prices skyrocket, which helps Iran’s economy and its hegemonic leverage.

Couple that capability with an Iranian west coast home port for attack vessels, and Tehran clinches a stranglehold on oil production and transit. Quickly the 29-mile-wide strategic Strait of Hormuz becomes a very dangerous place, through which half of the world’s seaborne oil shipments pass.

The Bahrain crisis is different from the unrest elsewhere, because Iran is likely at its center. For now, America’s best course of action is to be silent, unlike our interference in the Egyptian crisis. Let the affected nations—Bahrain and Saudi Arabia—resolve the situation without our meddling.

Mr. Maginnis is a retired Army lieutenant colonel, and a national security and foreign affairs analyst for radio and television.