President Barack Obama’s pre-war comments about the Libyan crisis convinced Muammar al-Gaddafi that he can survive.

Obama’s March 18 White House remarks came fewer than 24 hours after the United Nations Security Council voted to authorize military action—including a no-fly zone over Libya—to prevent the killing of civilians by Gaddafi’s forces.

Then on Saturday, coalition forces launched Operation Odyssey Dawn by raining more than 110 mostly American Tomahawk missiles on Libya’s critical nodes.  That opening salvo followed Gaddafi’s declaration of a unilateral cease-fire that proved to be a tactical feign.  The dictator called for a cease-fire to buy time to reposition his forces for the assault on Benghazi, the rebel-held eastern city.

But Gaddafi’s announcement was also meant to confuse the war-weary British and French publics that are skeptical about their governments’ campaign for U.N.-authorized military action against Libya .

Although the war is in its early stages, it is clear Gaddafi may be out-gunned but not necessarily outwitted.   He quickly turned on the propaganda machine to rally support against the “crusaders” and to claim innocent civilians were killed by coalition bombs.  But more important than the psychological war now raging, Gaddafi is banking his survival on four limitations outlined in Obama’s pre-war remarks.

First, Obama has limited interest in the crisis.  He acknowledged that if left “unchecked,” Gaddafi will “commit atrocities against his people.  Many thousands could die.”  So he “checked” the regime’s actions by starting another war, which, like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, could easily morph into a long-term insurgency.

But America’s interests, claimed Obama, are keeping the region stable, which he admits “will not and cannot be imposed by the United States.”  He rightly places that responsibility on the Arab world, which at this point appears unwilling to pay the price of meaningful intervention.

Besides putting the onus on the Arabs, Obama also distanced himself from what former Secretary of State and Gen. Colin Powell said before our Iraq invasion:  “You break it, you own it.”  He wiggled out of that obligation on Friday when he said, “More nations [not just America ] bear the responsibility and the cost of enforcing international law.”  Translation:  The U.S. will have a limited role.

The commander-in-chief punctuated America’s limited role by leaving Washington just before the attack.  Further, he diminished the importance of that attack by traveling to Brazil, one of five nations that failed to endorse the U.N. military action against Libya.  That’s a slap in the face of every armed services member now fighting Libya .

Also, Obama puts fighting this war somewhere in importance below the health care debate.  Last year, Obama cancelled an overseas trip to focus on the health care debate.  Obviously, the commander-in-chief doesn’t believe starting another Mideast war rises to the same level of importance.

Second, America’s military role will be very limited.  The U.S. “is prepared to act as part of an international coalition,” Obama said.  Then he said, “We are coordinating closely with them [the coalition] and our role is primarily to help shape the conditions for the international community to act together.”

Shaping means the U.S. will play a behind-the-scenes role.  For example, Obama said Secretary of Defense Robert Gates would help “coordinate planning.”  On March 10, Gates met his counterparts at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, to begin planning the operation, which includes the always-complicated rules of engagement to limit harm to civilians.

Over the weekend, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with European and Arab partners to discuss enforcement of the U.N. resolution, which is a way of saying the details regarding which nations will do what are still in the works.  Once the negotiations with the foreign ministers are completed, their military forces will mass for the air campaign against Libya in earnest.

America’s shaping role, according to Obama, also includes the provision of “the unique capabilities that we can bring to bear … enabling our … partners to effectively enforce a no-fly zone.”  That means providing our allies targeting information from our sophisticated platforms, air refueling for partner fighters, conducting sea-launched missile attacks, and participating in enforcement of the arms embargo.

But any way you slice it, America just declared war on Libya and was the first to launch an actual attack.  What is the strategy that limits America’s role?

Third, the no-fly zone will have limited impact.  The threat is no longer from Gaddafi’s 374 aircraft but from those ground forces closing in on Benghazi.  That’s why Gaddafi declared a unilateral cease-fire in response to the U.N.’s use of force.  He needed time to consolidate gains ahead of coalition air strikes.

We saw a similar situation in the 1990s in Bosnia and Croatia.  While NATO dithered with a no-fly zone, the former Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic allegedly massacred tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Croats, including the 1995 massacre of 8,000 Muslims in Srebrenica.

What the coalition must now do is declare a no-drive zone between Ajdabiya and Benghazi, the military’s main supply route.  But the challenge for the coalition is sorting out military from civilian traffic.  That’s where ground forces would be especially helpful and the political damage is potentially greatest for the coalition.

Fourth, Obama limited America’s role by putting ground troops off the table.  He said “We are not going to use force to go beyond a well-defined goal—specifically, the protection of civilians in Libya [via a no-fly zone].”  But without ground operations it is highly unlikely Gaddafi can be stopped and just as unlikely the dictator will ever be held “accountable,” which Obama promised.

Yes, the European-led coalition has ground troops, but not enough to conquer Libya, which is a giant country—larger than Alaska, with 1,100 miles of coastline and a population of 6.5 million living mostly near that coast.  Our allies have insufficient forces to sustain widespread operations unless limited to Benghazi—the rebel-held city of 700,000.  Of course, Obama has already said no to American ground troops.

Alternatively, allied special operations forces such as the British Special Air Service will play the primary ground role.  They will advise and equip the rebels, call in fighter strikes on Libyan forces, and target Libyan leaders.  Capturing or killing Gaddafi and his key military subordinates could be a mission subject to international law and rules of engagement.

The multi-phased operation is gaining clarity.  What is unclear is just how far the European-led coalition is willing to go and whether Gaddafi can consolidate his gains in Benghazi before the coalition becomes fully operational—the Schwerpunkt of this operation.

Gaddafi understands the implications of a limited American role.  He knows the coalition will severely damage his arsenal and impose a no-fly zone, but without a sizable invasion and occupation, which is doubtful at this point, the regime will survive and thanks primarily to President Obama.

By: -Col. Bob Maginnis

Libya’s leader Muammar al-Gaddafi has a bright future with President Obama running America’s foreign policy if the messages to the dictator coming from the White House are trustworthy.

Even the liberal media are attacking Obama’s messages about Libya. The New York Times editorialized, “It’s dangerous to make threats if you’re not prepared to follow through.” The Atlantic Monthly called on Obama to be clear: “But if the U.S. is to stay home, the President should explain why he is willing to accept bloodshed that does not intersect with U.S. interests.”

Consider five Obama messages to Gaddafi that make our President and, by association, America appear feckless.

Obama’s first message to Colonel Gaddafi is leave, then go to jail. The President said, “I am absolutely clear that it is in the interests of the United States … for Mr. Gaddafi to leave.” But then why did Obama support the United Nation’s decision to prosecute Gaddafi and his lieutenants for war crimes?

Obama supported former rulers such as Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak giving up power and then heading into exile, not jail. That transition quickly defused a tense situation. But Obama wants Gaddafi turned over to the International Criminal Court to face prosecution. Facing certain prosecution for war crimes may well be the reason Gaddafi chose to battle his own people instead of seeking exile.

Obama’s second message to Gaddafi is that the UN’s arms embargo applies to both the dictator and the rebels alike. Two weeks ago, the UN imposed an arms embargo with Washington’s support designed to weaken Gaddafi by preventing him from acquiring weapons. But then the U.S. State Department realized the same embargo prohibits shipments of defensive arms to the rebels too.

This act has the unintended consequence of guaranteeing Gaddafi’s well-armed forces will win against the ill-equipped rebels. Now Obama is trying to amend the embargo to allow for arming the rebels.

Doesn’t Team Obama remember a similar situation in 1991? At that time the UN imposed an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia, but that act helped the well-armed President Slobodan Milosevic unleash wars against lightly armed Bosnia and Croatia, leaving a quarter of a million people dead.

Obama’s third message to Gaddafi is the White House staff is divided over the Libyan’s chances of survival. Last week James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, testified that Gaddafi “will prevail” over the opposition, which is contrary to the White House’s promise that Gaddafi’s “days are numbered.”

Obama’s National Security Adviser Thomas Donilon, put a contrary spin on Clapper’s testimony. “If you did a static and one-dimensional assessment of just looking at order of battle and mercenaries,” Donilon said, that would lead “to a different conclusion about how this is going to go forward.”

Donilon’s contrary multidimensional assessment places considerable reliance on the impact of UN sanctions and seizing $30 billion in Gaddafi’s assets. But the Libyan has more than enough arms and money to outlast the rebels, which explains Clapper’s assessment.

Gaddafi reportedly has “tens of billions” in cash in Tripoli, allowing him to prolong his fight, according to the New York Times. He also has hidden funds under the names of family members and close associates and continues to pump 400,000 barrels of oil at $100 per barrel each day.

Obama’s fourth message to Gaddafi is the U.S. isn’t likely to become militarily involved in Libya. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned about the dangers of American military involvement, unless it is authorized by the UN. He said “a no-fly zone [something the Libyan rebels, allies such as France, and the Arab League support] begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defenses,” which would make the U.S. party to the conflict.

Last week Obama muddied the waters regarding possible military intervention. “The bottom line is that I have not taken any options off the table at this point,” Obama said. But his ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, had already dismissed a no-fly zone, according to the Wall Street Journal. “The kinds of capabilities that are being used to attack the rebel forces and, indeed, the population, will be largely unaffected by a no-fly zone,” Daalder said.

NATO is planning to impose a no-fly zone, anticipating that the UN might provide the authority. But NATO, which operates by consensus, lacks the support of member Turkey, which called such an action “unthinkable.”

Even if efforts to launch a no-fly zone mission fail, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is ready to aid the rebels. Clinton plans to meet with Libyan opposition leaders this week in Tunisia, and Donilon said Obama is looking for ways to aid the Libyan leader’s opponents, including providing arms.

Let’s hope Obama won’t arm the rebels with highly trafficable Stinger anti-aircraft missiles that could land in the hands of al-Qaeda or Mexican drug cartels. We are still paying a price for the weapons given the Afghan Taliban during its 1980s war with the former Soviet Union .

Obama’s fifth message to Gaddafi is America’s response to the Libyan crisis depends on UN approval. Back in 1986, then-President Ronald Reagan took action against Gaddafi without asking for the UN’s permission. Reagan bombed Gaddafi’s Tripoli palaces in response to a Libyan terrorist attack at a Berlin discotheque that killed two and wounded 50 American soldiers.

But Obama appears content to let the UN and other nations lead the search for solutions in Libya. He waited for a UN resolution on the embargo and now is waiting on a no-fly zone decision. His dependence on the UN isn’t becoming of the world’s sole superpower and certainly won’t help America’s credibility with anxious allies and adversaries such as Iran.

For now, Tripoli remains under Gaddafi’s iron grip, which presents two choices. Either Obama works with our partners to replace Gaddafi, which could require force and lots of follow-up assistance, and risks seeing someone worse—an Islamist—rise to lead that nation, or we sit back and allow the Libyans to resolve the crisis themselves.

Should Gaddafi survive this crisis, he could end up like Iraq’s former dictator Saddam Hussein after the 1991 Gulf War. Saddam was isolated, faced crippling embargoes that hurt the average Iraqi, and he returned to dangerous habits.

Like Saddam, Gaddafi might renew his support for terrorists and restart his weapons-of-mass-destruction programs. During the 1970s and 1980s, Gaddafi armed terrorist groups, including the Abu Nidal organization, and used his agents to bomb Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland. He also developed weapons of mass destruction—biological, and chemical, and he had a nuclear program—which he abandoned in 2004 because of threats from then-President George W. Bush.

There is no guarantee Libya would be any better off if Gaddafi leaves, a risk Obama must take if he decides to intervene. But at least Team Obama should stop sending mixed and conflicted messages that damage our credibility and encourage Libya’s dictator.

Mr. Maginnis is a retired Army lieutenant colonel, and a national security and foreign affairs analyst for radio and television.

By: -Col. Bob Maginnis

Libya’s leader Muammar al-Gaddafi has a bright future with President Obama running America’s foreign policy if the messages to the dictator coming from the White House are trustworthy.

Even the liberal media are attacking Obama’s messages about Libya. The New York Times editorialized, “It’s dangerous to make threats if you’re not prepared to follow through.” The Atlantic Monthly called on Obama to be clear: “But if the U.S. is to stay home, the President should explain why he is willing to accept bloodshed that does not intersect with U.S. interests.”

Consider five Obama messages to Gaddafi that make our President and, by association, America appear feckless.

Obama’s first message to Colonel Gaddafi is leave, then go to jail. The President said, “I am absolutely clear that it is in the interests of the United States … for Mr. Gaddafi to leave.” But then why did Obama support the United Nation’s decision to prosecute Gaddafi and his lieutenants for war crimes?

Obama supported former rulers such as Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak giving up power and then heading into exile, not jail. That transition quickly defused a tense situation. But Obama wants Gaddafi turned over to the International Criminal Court to face prosecution. Facing certain prosecution for war crimes may well be the reason Gaddafi chose to battle his own people instead of seeking exile.

Obama’s second message to Gaddafi is that the UN’s arms embargo applies to both the dictator and the rebels alike. Two weeks ago, the UN imposed an arms embargo with Washington’s support designed to weaken Gaddafi by preventing him from acquiring weapons. But then the U.S. State Department realized the same embargo prohibits shipments of defensive arms to the rebels too.

This act has the unintended consequence of guaranteeing Gaddafi’s well-armed forces will win against the ill-equipped rebels. Now Obama is trying to amend the embargo to allow for arming the rebels.

Doesn’t Team Obama remember a similar situation in 1991? At that time the UN imposed an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia, but that act helped the well-armed President Slobodan Milosevic unleash wars against lightly armed Bosnia and Croatia, leaving a quarter of a million people dead.

Obama’s third message to Gaddafi is the White House staff is divided over the Libyan’s chances of survival. Last week James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, testified that Gaddafi “will prevail” over the opposition, which is contrary to the White House’s promise that Gaddafi’s “days are numbered.”

Obama’s National Security Adviser Thomas Donilon, put a contrary spin on Clapper’s testimony. “If you did a static and one-dimensional assessment of just looking at order of battle and mercenaries,” Donilon said, that would lead “to a different conclusion about how this is going to go forward.”

Donilon’s contrary multidimensional assessment places considerable reliance on the impact of UN sanctions and seizing $30 billion in Gaddafi’s assets. But the Libyan has more than enough arms and money to outlast the rebels, which explains Clapper’s assessment.

Gaddafi reportedly has “tens of billions” in cash in Tripoli, allowing him to prolong his fight, according to the New York Times. He also has hidden funds under the names of family members and close associates and continues to pump 400,000 barrels of oil at $100 per barrel each day.

Obama’s fourth message to Gaddafi is the U.S. isn’t likely to become militarily involved in Libya. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned about the dangers of American military involvement, unless it is authorized by the UN. He said “a no-fly zone [something the Libyan rebels, allies such as France, and the Arab League support] begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defenses,” which would make the U.S. party to the conflict.

Last week Obama muddied the waters regarding possible military intervention. “The bottom line is that I have not taken any options off the table at this point,” Obama said. But his ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, had already dismissed a no-fly zone, according to the Wall Street Journal. “The kinds of capabilities that are being used to attack the rebel forces and, indeed, the population, will be largely unaffected by a no-fly zone,” Daalder said.

NATO is planning to impose a no-fly zone, anticipating that the UN might provide the authority. But NATO, which operates by consensus, lacks the support of member Turkey, which called such an action “unthinkable.”

Even if efforts to launch a no-fly zone mission fail, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is ready to aid the rebels. Clinton plans to meet with Libyan opposition leaders this week in Tunisia, and Donilon said Obama is looking for ways to aid the Libyan leader’s opponents, including providing arms.

Let’s hope Obama won’t arm the rebels with highly trafficable Stinger anti-aircraft missiles that could land in the hands of al-Qaeda or Mexican drug cartels. We are still paying a price for the weapons given the Afghan Taliban during its 1980s war with the former Soviet Union .

Obama’s fifth message to Gaddafi is America’s response to the Libyan crisis depends on UN approval. Back in 1986, then-President Ronald Reagan took action against Gaddafi without asking for the UN’s permission. Reagan bombed Gaddafi’s Tripoli palaces in response to a Libyan terrorist attack at a Berlin discotheque that killed two and wounded 50 American soldiers.

But Obama appears content to let the UN and other nations lead the search for solutions in Libya. He waited for a UN resolution on the embargo and now is waiting on a no-fly zone decision. His dependence on the UN isn’t becoming of the world’s sole superpower and certainly won’t help America’s credibility with anxious allies and adversaries such as Iran.

For now, Tripoli remains under Gaddafi’s iron grip, which presents two choices. Either Obama works with our partners to replace Gaddafi, which could require force and lots of follow-up assistance, and risks seeing someone worse—an Islamist—rise to lead that nation, or we sit back and allow the Libyans to resolve the crisis themselves.

Should Gaddafi survive this crisis, he could end up like Iraq’s former dictator Saddam Hussein after the 1991 Gulf War. Saddam was isolated, faced crippling embargoes that hurt the average Iraqi, and he returned to dangerous habits.

Like Saddam, Gaddafi might renew his support for terrorists and restart his weapons-of-mass-destruction programs. During the 1970s and 1980s, Gaddafi armed terrorist groups, including the Abu Nidal organization, and used his agents to bomb Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland. He also developed weapons of mass destruction—biological, and chemical, and he had a nuclear program—which he abandoned in 2004 because of threats from then-President George W. Bush.

There is no guarantee Libya would be any better off if Gaddafi leaves, a risk Obama must take if he decides to intervene. But at least Team Obama should stop sending mixed and conflicted messages that damage our credibility and encourage Libya’s dictator.

Attacks like the one that killed two American airmen at Frankfurt Airport last Wednesday will increase because Islamist terrorism is surging, especially among lone wolfs.  The only solution is to defeat extremists and their hosts, which could take decades if we have the will.

American service members such as those murdered last week will continue to be the Islamists’ primary target.  Our troops symbolize America’s foreign policy, which offends many Islamists, and they are the most visible American government representatives at home and abroad.

That Islamists are targeting our troops more frequently at home is an important fact for the House of Representatives to consider during hearings this week on the radicalization of American Muslims.

The Congress should consider evidence that U.S.-based Islamists are waging an escalating campaign of terror, especially against our war-weary armed forces.  Publicly known Islamist incidents include the murders at an Army recruiting office in Little Rock, Ark., and the Fort Hood, Tex., massacre that claimed 13 lives and wounded another 43.

The foiled Islamist cases reported in the press are especially sobering.  Last week, for example, two New Jersey men pleaded guilty to trying to link up with Somali Islamic extremists in an effort to kill American troops abroad.  Other recent cases include the failed Islamist plans to shoot down military aircraft in New York, murder Marines in Virginia, and attack military recruiting stations in Maryland, California, and one in Texas whose perpetrators intended to use weapons of mass destruction.

These incidents combined with the failed Christmas Day 2009 airline bombing and the 2010 attempted Times Square attack should force all Americans to face a stark reality.  The Islamist threat is getting worse, law enforcement can’t stop all the fanatics, and our military—a frequent jihadist target—must do a better job of defending itself.  The final reality is that defeating Islamic extremism is proving to be a very complex, long-term challenge.

First, there is evidence the Islamist threat will get worse at home.  Senior officials including Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano confirm as much.  “Home-based terrorism is here.  And, like violent extremism abroad, it will be part of the threat picture that we must now confront,” Napolitano said.

The Internet is a popular and effective tool used to recruit and radicalize jihadists.  The Frankfurt jihadist’s Facebook profile makes plain his Islamist political leanings and approval of jihad.  He told German police he was inspired to kill the airmen after seeing an online video showing American soldiers raiding an Afghan home and raping a girl, according to the Wall Street Journal.

Social-media jihadist promoter Anwar al-Awlaki regularly posts hate-spewing YouTube videos that are wildly popular.  The American-born cleric, now hiding in Yemen, warns Muslims to “never, ever trust a kuffar [non-Muslim],” praises the attempt by the Detroit-bound airline bomber, and explains why American civilians are legitimate targets.  Al-Awlaki is tied to the Fort Hood massacre and helped inspire Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bombing suspect.

Recently, other jihadist leaders harnessed Islamist websites to advocate simpler attacks, as opposed to operations such as the 9/11 assaults.  Specifically, al-Qaeda spokesmen Nasir al-Wahayshi and Adam Gadahn called for numerous simpler attacks against soft targets using improvised explosive devices, guns, or even knives and clubs.  Their call may explain why law enforcement is concerned about more lone wolf-type attacks.

Second, law enforcement leaders such as Mitchell Silber, the director of intelligence analysis for the New York Police Department, warn of another reality.  Silber said the number of foiled cases “indicate that radicalization to violence is taking place in the United States, ” which is a major challenge for law enforcement, and foiling these cases could get tougher if their frequency and sophistication increase.

Fortunately, law enforcement successfully stops most jihadist attacks, but not all.  The attempted Detroit airliner bombing and the Times Square incident failed because of jihadist mistakes, not good law enforcement.  But jihadists are learning from their failures, and so is law enforcement.

Reportedly, lessons learned from the 2004 Madrid, Spain, and 2007 Mumbai, India, attacks helped New York officials stop several plots directed against New York’s subway system.  Federal agents also applied lessons from past attacks to foil a jihadist case involving six ethnic Albanian Muslim men who planned to massacre American soldiers at Fort Dix, New Jersey .

Federal officials were tipped off by the wannabe killers’ poor terror tradecraft.  The jihadists made a videotape of them calling for “jihad” and practicing with assault weapons and then naively took the tape to a store for copying.  The store owner alerted the authorities who opened the investigation.

The conspirators also insisted on purchasing illegal fully automatic weapons.  Both tradecraft errors were widely publicized and likely won’t be repeated by the next jihadist group.

The third reality is that our military will continue to be a popular jihadist target.  That fact explains the significant increase in security around military installations to include strict procedures for accessing bases, and more barriers and guards.  The Pentagon also requires troops take annual anti-terrorism classes.

But the military’s jihadist problem has an internal component, as illustrated by the Fort Hood massacre.  Army Maj. Gen. Robert Radin, the leader of his service’s Internal Review Team, said, “We must efficiently and effectively transform how we look at protecting the force.”  Unfortunately the Army’s report labels the attack a “tragedy” rather than an Islamist terrorist attack, a fatal flaw.

Sen. Joe Lieberman (I.-Conn.) rightly faults the Army for failing to explain “that we are threatened by violent Islamist extremism and that an Army major who made public statements supportive of this murderous ideology was not stopped.”  Lieberman called on the Pentagon and the FBI to “deal directly and effectively with the deadly threat that violent Islamist extremism poses to our service members.”

It would also be refreshing if President Obama admitted we have an Islamic problem, but given his track record, that is doubtful.

Finally, the jihadist threat could get worse if the unrest sweeping the Mideast results in more radicalized Islamic governments that harbor terrorists.  That is why defensive measures alone are insufficient to remove the Islamist scourge. 

The only way to stop Islamist terrorism is to defeat it at the core.  The radicals that spew their hatred must be eliminated and regimes that harbor them must stop doing so or be removed.

Congress can help by insisting the Pentagon and law enforcement honestly identify the root cause of much of the terrorist threat—Islamic extremism—and provide public servants the laws and methods to eliminate the radicals and their sponsors.

By: -Col. Bob Maginnis

Saudi Arabia controls the world’s largest oil reserves, and if that spigot is shut off by Mideast chaos, the global economy could be devastated. That is why the West must encourage the Saudis to mitigate their vulnerabilities, but be prepared to respond if the kingdom falls.

The Saudi monarchy is preparing for the worst case. For the first time last week, a Saudi youth group connected with others by social media to plan a peaceful demonstration in Jeddah expressing solidarity with anti-government protesters in Libya. Fortunately for Riyadh, that demonstration and another among Shiite citizens in the Eastern province weren’t violent like the protests in Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen.

But Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz’s perception of the growing threat of social unrest prompted him to throw money at the problem. Last week he announced a $37 billion benefits package to create 1,200 new jobs, raise cost-of-living allowances, grant interest-free home loans, and more.

The king should be concerned about the spreading unrest because Saudi Arabia has striking similarities with countries already racked by chaos. For example, the king runs Saudi Arabia with the same autocratic style that former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak used, and the Saudi monarchy bases its political system on family and tribal links, as in Yemen.

But these similarities are somewhat mitigated by Saudi differences. Much of the discontent expressed in neighboring countries is attributed to high unemployment and living costs, which the Saudis address by shoveling money at their difficulties.

Saudi Arabia is also different because it is a country of tribes connected by marriage, creating a land unified by family ties. Also, the House of Saud, the ruling family, is not the typical isolated monarchy. Rather, it has 30,000 members, including thousands of princes who are integrated throughout society.

The House of Saud also has a very unique relationship with the country’s religious leaders. The 18th century Saudi ruler Abdallah bin Muhammad bin Saud married his son Abdul Aziz to the daughter of Shaikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the puritanical Wahhabi movement. That union created the First Saudi State and explains the royal family’s advocacy for both Salafi Islam and unification of Saudi Arabia.

But these distinctives may not vaccinate the monarchy from four vulnerabilities.

First, the House of Saud is vulnerable because it hoards wealth and governing power. Saudi citizens are growing angry with their government as the population expands, per capita income drops, and young people lust for more liberty. That discontent is feeding a groundswell of calls for jihad against the royal family.

The rage and regional chaos may collide to form a tipping point for the kingdom. The monarch and his top princes are very old, and new blood must be installed. That reshuffling will remind anxious Saudis of Mubarak, who tried but failed to install his son as president. Saudis will ask themselves, too, why they must tolerate dictators.

Saudi citizens are also understandably impatient after having submitted petitions calling for a constitutional monarchy—a form of government in which the monarch acts as head of state within the parameters of a constitution. Calls for a constitutional monarchy and the kingdom’s pending leadership shuffle could become the tipping point that ends the House of Saud’s dynasty.

Second, the regime is vulnerable because it fails to treat political reform seriously. Last week Prince Alwaleed bin Talal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, a grandson of the founding king of Saudi Arabia, wrote in the New York Times, “Unless many Arab governments adopt radically different policies, their countries will very likely experience more political and civil unrest.”

He labeled Arab political systems “outmoded and brittle” and said, “Arab governments can no longer afford to take their populations for granted, or to assume that they will remain static and subdued.” But Saudi Arabia’s monarch is only half listening to reformers.

Saudi King Abdullah responded to calls for reform by instituting a “National Dialogue” process, which allegedly provides Saudi citizens the means to criticize their government. But some citizens who used the process to identify grievances were arrested and detained, creating doubt about the royal family’s reform commitment.

Similarly, in 2005 the Saudi monarchy hosted elections for municipal councils, which were granted nominal powers to oversee local governments and make recommendations to national leaders. But as with the National Dialogue process, the municipal councils were ignored or not sufficiently empowered to do their jobs.

Third, the regime is vulnerable because social reform could fracture the stabilizing monarchy-Wahhabi relationship. The Saudi monarchy maintains its legitimacy among conservative constituent groups by carefully managing changes that could affect established religious practices, even though the lack of change stifles democratic reform.

The Congressional Research Service’s 2010 report on Saudi Arabia states, “Since 2006, significant public debates have occurred on social issues such as the powers of religious police, education reform proposals, and the roles and rights of women and the integration of Shiites into Saudi Arabia’s predominantly Sunni society.” Wahhabi clerics oversee these issues, and any challenge to that authority could split the unique state-religion relationship, which might radicalize the Saudi clerics who allegedly support terror groups such as al-Qaeda.

Finally, the rise of Iran and its Arab Shiite allies is a Saudi vulnerability. King Abdullah believes Iran stirs up Saudi’s Shia minority—15% of the population—much as it is said to be doing in next-door Bahrain.

Last week King Abdullah met with the king of Bahrain, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, to discuss the Shia political uprising there. These Sunni leaders accuse their Shiite populations of loyalty to Iran, a charge Shiites say is used to stoke sectarian tensions and justify opposition to democracy.

But Saudis feel threatened because they are encircled by Shia-leaning governments—Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and possibly soon Bahrain. Alireza Nader, an expert in international affairs, told the New York Times, “They worry that the region is ripe for Iranian exploitation. Iran has shown that it is very capable of taking advantage of regional instability.”

There is a history of tensions among Saudi Shiites. Two years ago, Saudi police launched a search for Shiite preacher Nimr al-Nimr, who suggested in a sermon that Shiites could one day form their own separate state. That secessionist threat followed clashes between the Sunni religious police and Shiite pilgrims near the tomb of Prophet Muhammad in Medina.

The Saudi Shia last rose up in mass civil disobedience in the intifada of 1979, inspired by Iran’s Islamic revolution. Recently, Tehran openly endorsed the “rightful demands” of the Arab protest movement, which supports the Saudi view that Iran is attempting to create a Mideast “Shia Crescent” to become the hegemonic force in global oil.

The Saudi royals can avoid collapse by mitigating vulnerabilities. But if the monarchy falls, the West must be prepared to step in, militarily and otherwise, to stabilize the country, keep Iran at bay, and sustain the oil flowing.

By: -Col. Bob Maginnis

Bahrain, a Persian Gulf island nation, has been swept up in the pro-democracy protests parading across the Mideast. But Bahrain’s protests are different because of Iran’s influence.

A democratic outcome from the current crisis could land Bahrain under the thumb of Shia Islamists aligned with Iran. Tehran would use that influence to close America’s military facilities in Bahrain, expand its reach by instigating rebellion among Saudi Shia, and leverage the global oil market.

This would put Tehran in the catbird seat as the region’s uncontested hegemon.

Bahrain’s pro-democracy crisis started with crowds of Shiite Muslims seeking reforms in a country ruled by a Sunni royal family. The protesters demanded the monarchy give up control over top government posts to allow Shia political representation proportional to their numbers. Bahrain is 70% Shia.

Bahrain’s military responded with brutal force. Last Thursday, Bahraini soldiers used teargas, rubber bullets, and buckshot to clear Shiite protesters from Pearl Square in Manama, the capital city. Shiite protesters retook Pearl Square on Feb. 19 after the military withdrew, but the opposition has yet to accept the monarchy’s plea for dialogue.

This crisis dates back to last summer, when government agents arrested scores of Shiite activists before parliamentary elections. But even with the harassment, the main Shiite faction, an Islamist group called Al Wefaq (Accord), won 18 of the 40 seats in the lower house. Those members walked out of parliament after the government attacked the protesters last week.

Iran’s role in the current crisis is unconfirmed. However, Tehran’s history is intertwined with Bahrain’s, and it has a motive. The nations maintain cultural, religious, and economic ties, and Persian (Farsi) is widely spoken in Bahrain.

For more than a century, Iran and Bahrain disputed over Bahrain’s sovereignty, until a 1970 survey determined that Bahrainis overwhelmingly desired independence. That decision was embraced by Iran’s Shah and ratified by Iran’s parliament, but suspicions still linger.

Bahraini officials suspect Iran wants to reclaim sovereignty. Twice (1981 and 1996) Bahrain accused Iran of trying to organize a coup by pro-Iranian Bahraini Shiites. Also, Iranian media and political leaders consistently claim Bahrain should never have become formally independent of Iran.

Two years ago the former Iranian parliament speaker Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri described as “inspector general” in the office of Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei (the Ayatollah), complained that under the Shah, “Bahrain was our 14th province and had a representative at the parliament,” according to the international Arabic daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi.

Houda Nonoo, Bahrain’s U.S. ambassador, said, “Iran has had claims in the past on Bahrain.” She said the 2009 claim was “very similar to [Saddam Hussein’s] Iraq mentioning Kuwait as their 19th province,” according to the Washington Times.

There is recent evidence of Iranian involvement from the U.S. intelligence think tank Stratfor. It cites diplomatic sources that claim Lebanese Shia living in the United Arab Emirates entered Bahrain to participate in demonstrations. Also, Bahraini authorities reported arresting Lebanese Hezbollah—read Iranian proxies—in Pearl Square last week, and a different Stratfor source said roughly 100 Hezbollah operatives entered the United Arab Emirates beginning in January.

Whether Iran seeks to reclaim Bahrain and/or is stoking unrest via proxies is unconfirmed. But it is clear Tehran has exercised similar influence in Lebanon and Iraq. And it is also clear Iran would benefit if the current crisis results in a Shia-controlled Bahrain.

First, Iran would use a Bahrain platform to destabilize neighbor Saudi Arabia by instigating unrest among its Shia population. That could disrupt the flow of oil and/or radically alter the kingdom’s government and the region’s balance of power.

Riyadh sees Iran’s hand in Shiite empowerment in Baghdad and Beirut, and anticipates the same potential among its Shiite minority in the kingdom’s oil-rich eastern province. It fears the Saudi Shia, which make up 30% of the kingdom’s population, could rise up to demand reform—or at least share power—much as the Shia in Bahrain.

Last month, Saudi King Abdullah rebuked President Obama for insisting the Egypt crisis was not a homegrown uprising, but the result of Iranian interference. That is why the king will do everything possible to help Bahrain resist the Shia uprising, and should it come to Riyadh, the king won’t hesitate to use force. Stratfor’s sources indicate Saudi special operations forces are already in Bahrain helping put down the unrest.

Second, Iran would boot American forces out of Bahrain and replace them with its Revolutionary Guard forces. Tehran uses the Revolutionary Guard in Lebanon to train terrorist proxy Hezbollah and in Iraq to empower Shia power broker cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s insurgent Mahdi Army.

The 60-year-old U.S.-Bahrain relationship, which is built around defense issues, would end if an Iran-favoring government takes power. For now, Bahrain relies on U.S. security guarantees, and in exchange American forces enjoy access to air and naval facilities for the Fifth Fleet, which controls two carrier battle groups, monitors strategic passages such as the Strait of Hormuz, and tracks Iran’s navies—the Iranian fleet and the Revolutionary Guard’s navy.

Finally, Iran would threaten the flow of Persian Gulf oil if it had its way in Bahrain. Manama is not a major oil producer, but it does share with Saudi Arabia the 300,000 barrels per day exported from the offshore Abu Safa field.

But the real threat is Iran’s aim to leverage all Persian Gulf oil production. Iran already owns the world’s third-largest oil reserves, followed by fourth-place Iraq. Baghdad’s Shia-controlled government is in lockstep with Tehran and will soon be free of American forces, and therefore more vulnerable to Tehran’s influence.

Saudi Arabia has the world’s largest oil reserves, which Iran would like to control as well. A pro-Iran Bahrain would provide Tehran a platform from which to seed Saudi Shia insurrection much as it did in Iraq. No telling what might happen if Saudi Shiites sitting atop the kingdom’s oil fields cooperate with Iranian agents.

Bahrain would also provide Iran access to transit channels for oil tankers leaving Saudi Arabia’s loading facilities. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard navy could use that access to create coastal minefields—a capability it possesses—to control shipments, or soldiers could sabotage ships, as in a terrorist group’s attack on a Japanese oil tanker last summer. Both ways, the effect is to slow exports, making crude oil prices skyrocket, which helps Iran’s economy and its hegemonic leverage.

Couple that capability with an Iranian west coast home port for attack vessels, and Tehran clinches a stranglehold on oil production and transit. Quickly the 29-mile-wide strategic Strait of Hormuz becomes a very dangerous place, through which half of the world’s seaborne oil shipments pass.

The Bahrain crisis is different from the unrest elsewhere, because Iran is likely at its center. For now, America’s best course of action is to be silent, unlike our interference in the Egyptian crisis. Let the affected nations—Bahrain and Saudi Arabia—resolve the situation without our meddling.

Mr. Maginnis is a retired Army lieutenant colonel, and a national security and foreign affairs analyst for radio and television.