By: Ariel Cohen – Middle East Times

Syrian President Bashar Assad joined Muammar Gadhafi of Libya in backing Russia’s lightning military action against Georgia, making Syria one of the few countries in the world to publicly back the Kremlin.

“We understand the essence of the Russian position and its military response,” Assad told Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at the start of their meeting in Moscow. “We believe Russia was responding to the Georgian provocation.”

At the start of the war, almost no country in the world came out in support of Russian action. Cuba and Libya were in the vanguard of the old Soviet coterie speaking out in support. Venezuela and Hamas chimed in, but even “brotherly” Belarus and historic ally Armenia, two countries over which Russia has the most sway, remained noticeably silent.

Good old days of the Cold War and U.S.-Russian competition may be returning to the Middle East. Damascus, supported by Iranian cash, wants bigger and better toys. The Baath regime signals that it is not serious about the still-born negotiations with Israel it conducted in Istanbul.

Assad has been seeking state-of-the-art SA-10s anti-aircraft missile system for close to a decade, and the sale has been blocked numerous times in the past, by pressure from the United States and Israel. Damascus also is interested in the long range S-300 anti-aircraft/anti-ballistic missile system Russia has sold to Tehran.

Assad said he hopes to offer Moscow the opportunity to deploy that type of missile in Syrian territory, as a counterweight to U.S. missiles in Poland, but it is clearly aimed at Israel. Syria also is asking short-range surface to surface ballistic missiles SS-21 SCARAB (9K79 Tochka) single-stage, short-range, tactical-ballistic missile and SS-26 Iskander short-range missile.

The SS-26 comes in two modifications: a longer range (greater than 400 km) variant for the Russian forces, and a shorter range (less than 300 km) version for export. If Syria gets either, it will be able to hit the Tel Aviv area with greater accuracy than with the current SCUDs. If Russia satisfies Syria’s demands, it will mean that it is seeking a confrontation with the United States not just in the Soviet periphery, but in the old battleground of the Middle East.

Lessons from the Georgia war are going to be studied in the Middle Eastern military academies for years to come. The early assessment signals the return of conventional military operations, 20th century style — with some elements of intensive information warfare and cyber attacks thrown in for a good measure.

The Russian General Staff planning provided a speed and complexity in implementing combined operations that were well prepared and reasonably executed. More important, the Russian offensive achieved a strategic surprise. Essentially, after regaining control of Tskhinvali, the Russian army conducted a two-pronged offensive against Georgia from South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This is purely within the tradition of the classical Russian operational art, of conducting more than one offensive operation to prevent the defender’s concentration of forces and overwhelm his defensive strategy.

The Russian military occupied the strategically vital highway and railway line which crosses central Georgia and links Tbilisi with the coastline, severing access to its main port, and essentially paralyzing and dividing the country in several parts.

Overwhelming Force

The Russian main ground forces involved in the invasion of Georgia belong to the 58th Army, which took part in the invasion and occupation of Chechnya since 1999. Other Russian units that are taking part in the campaign are the 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division based in Chechnya, the Guards “Pskov” 76th Guards Airborne Division, the 98th Guards Airborne Division based in Ivanovo, and the 45th Independent Strategic Reconnaissance Regiment, which is under the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (Spetsnaz GRU).

The Russian airborne troops operated from South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the invasion of Georgia, providing security to the Roki Tunnel; occupying Poti; destroying oil infrastructures there; and possibly participating in the capture of the strategic Inguri hydro power station without a shot fired. Ingrui station provides two-thirds of Georgia’s electricity.

Lessons Learned

A few preliminary lessons can be distilled after only 13 days since the beginning of hostilities. These include:

– Watch out for the Bear! Russian continental power is on the rise. Central European countries should watch their rhetoric, while staunchly defending their own national security interests. Small states need to treat nuclear armed great powers with respect. Provoking a militarily strong adversary is worthwhile only if you are confident of victory, and even then there may be bitter surprises, just as Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili found out.

– Combine NATO and U.S. Guarantees with Military Self-Reliance. European NATO members have much higher level of security guarantees than Georgia, including NATO’s Article Five. Yet, during the Cold War years, countries which had contingencies and training for popular resistance against the USSR — Albania, Romania, and Switzerland — had a higher level of security than those which only relied solely on U.S. troops or nukes. Revisiting civil defense and organized popular resistance may be in order.

– Airpower alone is not sufficient. Russia used air, armor, the Black Sea Fleet, special forces and allied militias. Clausewitzian lessons still apply: the use of combined operations with overwhelming force in the war’s center of gravity does work.

– Surprise and speed of operations still matter — as they have for 4,000 years of recorded history of warfare. To be successful, wars have to have limited and achievable goals. Russia achieved most of its goals between Friday and Monday, while the world, including U.S. President George W. Bush, was busy watching the Olympics and parliaments were on vacation.

– Do not cringe — within reason — from taking military casualties and inflicting overwhelming military and civilian causalities at a level unacceptable to the enemy. Georgia lost between 100-200 soldiers, and was routed. A tougher enemy, like Japan or Germany in World War II, or even a non-state actor like the Taliban or Hezbollah, could suffer a proportionally much higher rate of casualties and keep on fighting.

– Information and psychological warfare is paramount. So is cyber-security. It looks like the Russians conducted repeated denial of service attacks against Georgia (and in 2007, against Estonia), shutting down key Web sites. Russia was ready with accusation and footage of alleged Georgian atrocities in South Ossetia, attempting to shift the information operations playing fields from “aggressor-victim” to “saving Ossetian civilians from barbaric Georgians.” These operations also matter domestically, to shore support and boost morale at home.

Avoiding the New Cold War

It is still early to digest all the lessons of this conflict, but this geopolitical earthquake symbolizes that the tectonic plates of Eastern Europe and Western Eurasia are shifting. And this is just the beginning: the future of southern Caucasus, Ukraine and other countries of the former Soviet Empire is at play.

Most important, this war is not about Georgia, but about what kind of international actor Russia will be in the 21st century. If Russia expands its confrontation, grave implications for the Middle East will follow.

After an almost-20 year hiatus, the United States and NATO allies may once again prioritize Russia as a potential threat to their vital interests in Europe and beyond.

The question is whether NATO will send a strong signal to Moscow that its aggression will not stand. This should be done through tough diplomacy, in international organizations, and through inventive economic measures. The United States, its allies and Europe must do everything possible to reverse Russian aggression against Georgia — and to prevent further hostile action against its allies.