By: Ariel Cohen – News World Communications Inc.

Dynastic rulers and dictators in the Middle East stood amazed and impressed as the upper house of the Russian parliament passed constitutional amendments on Nov. 26, paving the way for Vladimir Putin to return to supreme power in the Kremlin – or for Medvedev to hold supreme power for Putin for the next 16 years.

TWO OF A KIND — President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev (L) looks on as Venezuela’s president Hugo Chavez speaks on the phone as they visit the Admiral Chabanenko, a Russian destroyer docked at La Guaira port, Venezuela on Nov. 27. Chavez is seeking a constitutional amendment that will allow him to be president for life. (Photo by ITAR-TASS / ABACAPRESS.COM via Newscom)

No family succession here, like in Jordan, Morocco, Syria, or – in the future, possibly – in Egypt. No messy, opaque Islamic politics, like in Iran.

The Russian example for the Middle East is ominous: observe the outward constitutional trappings of a power transition while deliberately destroying the democratic essence.

The Russian model of “sovereign democracy” – to use Marxist-Leninist language, “in form but not in content” – seriously challenges the American model promoted during the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations.

The United States has insisted that an open society, multi-party democracy and the rule of law, with free press, is a sine qua non of modernization. Russia (and China) beg to differ, providing an alternative model for the Middle East.

The rulers in Moscow and Beijing feel more secure when other countries follow their authoritarian market models, and fall in line, supporting anti-American geopolitics.

President Dmitry Medvedev’s announcement (Medvedev and the Constitution) two weeks ago that he may change the Russian Constitution to extend the presidential term for six years indicates that the process was orchestrated well in advance.

With the legislature and the national media firmly in the Kremlin’s hands, it is little wonder that the proposal gained immediate approval in the nation’s parliament and regional legislatures. If this happens, the Putin-Medvedev tandem would control the country for up to 24 years: Two terms of four years (2000-2007); a Medvedev interregnum under the Putin control (2008-2012), and potentially two six-year terms (2012-2024).

It didn’t have to be that way. The Russian Constitution proclaims a presidential republic in a multi-party system, with president as a “guarantor” of the Constitution.

However, checks and balances in Russia were underdeveloped after the collapse of communism in 1991, and non-existent before that. Moreover, since 2000, Russia further suffered from a serious deterioration of those political institutions, such as the Duma and the Supreme Court, which had a potential to balance the executive branch of power. Furthermore, the mass media has increasingly come under the state’s thumb, with the government now effectively controlling all TV channels and most of the central newspapers.

Governors and senators are effectively appointed by the executive branch. Political parties were defanged and brought under the Kremlin’s control, with the current 7 percent electoral barrier ensuring that since 2003 only the parties given a green light by the Kremlin get elected to the Duma.

Like in the Middle East, the economic crisis is buffeting Russia particularly hard. Being an energy and commodity exporter may be fun when global prosperity is in full blossom, but it really hurts when the world markets are tanking. And Russia is a high-cost oil producer. It is competitive when oil is above $75. It is sputtering when its Urals brand oil is below $50.

Many political analysts in Russia agree that the current rulers will not consider a peaceful power transition through election. If the Russian leaders are closing the door on the country’s peaceful political change, which may be necessary due to the economic crisis, they may be planting the seeds of widespread popular discontent, if not a revolution.

Internal politics always matter in foreign policy. Political developments in Moscow may make it difficult for the U.S. Barack Obama administration to deal with Russians on ballistic missile defense, the race for the Arctic, and other issues, as I suggested in two separate articles: Europe Anti-Missile Defense System: Standing Up to Russia’s Threats and Executive Summary: The New Cold War: Reviving the U.S. Presence in the Arctic.

Most importantly, the newly announced Obama administration’s foreign policy team will need to make serious choices in relations with such Middle Eastern heavyweights as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and others, who may prefer a “sovereign democracy” to an open society.