By: Ariel Cohen – Middle East Times

Turkey’s Constitutional Court on July 30 averted a potentially explosive political crisis when its judges rejected an attempt by the State Prosecutor to ban the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). The ban would have prohibited 71 senior members of the AKP from taking part in politics for five years and would have effectively brought down the government. AKP leader and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Turkey’s President Abdullah Gül were among the AKP leadership facing exclusion from political life. The ban, if enacted, also would have negated the will of 47 percent of Turkish voters who supported the party and would have dashed the country’s hopes of entering the European Union.

The political crisis that has been resolved, at least for now, but the Constitutional Court’s measured decision is just the tip of the iceberg. It would be an easy task for the court if the prosecution had presented clear evidence of a conspiracy to seize power, ties with foreign governments, or assassination plots.

The case, however, is more complicated. On the one hand, Turkey’s secular elites say the AKP has an agenda of creeping Islamization; while the AKP and supporters of democracy are worried about what steps Turkey’s elite, including the top-level bureaucracy and the military – the guardian of Atatürk’s secular revolution – may take to prevent what it sees as the realization of such an agenda. One does not have to look further back to than 1997 when the Turkish military took decisive action to guard secularism.

It is worth noting that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and a majority of the leaders of the AKP once belonged to Islamist Refah (Welfare) Party, which the military removed together with its leader, Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. Thus, the question remains over whether the hijab constitutional amendment and various other measures the AKP has taken constitute a “secret agenda.”

Despite these concerns, Erdogan’s party is enjoying broad popular support, while secular parties remain moribund. The AKP came to power in 2002 and won 2007 parliamentary elections with 47 percent of the vote, receiving 341 seats in the 550-member legislature. Its electoral success has been the result of Erdogan’s great political skill with the low middle classes and migrants from the Anatolian (hinterland) who moved to the big cities. Pro-EU and liberal market policies help the AKP among the entrepreneurs.

Washington is facing difficult choices vis-à-vis its friend, Turkey. On the one hand, the United States supports democracy worldwide, and in the Middle East in particular. A ban on the AKP would be a setback to such a policy. Yet, a prolonged rule by the AKP may transform the U.S. ally into an Islamic republic increasingly hostile to the United States and its allies.

Turkey’s recent crisis has thrown into stark relief some of the nation’s underlying economic, political, and cultural tensions. The March 2008 indictment against the AKP prompted a political crisis that has led to economic uncertainties. The Turkish stock market has been down 20 percent this year and foreign direct investment has been only $6 billion, a dramatic decrease from $20 billion in 2007.

Additional instability was fueled by an investigation into the Ergenekon gang, a secular, shadowy organization led by a number of former generals who have plotted political murders and attacks as part of its ultimate aim to overthrow the government.

Washington should applaud the court’s balanced decision, which upholds the rule of law. The United States should continue to encourage Turkey’s Western orientation, economic reform, civil rights, and aspirations to join Europe. Also, the U.S. should emphasize its desire to maintain robust bilateral relations with Turkey, including in the security area. The United States should continue the dialogue with Turkey on fighting terrorism, on Iraq, on the Iranian challenge, Afghanistan, and resurgent Russia. Washington should also expand energy and trade cooperation with Ankara.

We are witnessing a battle for the heart and soul of the country, for its future. The Turkish Constitutional Court will remain the last resort against anti-constitutional activities by Islamist parties.

The battle between the AKP and the secular forces is essentially both political and religious. Ultimately, secular forces need to be better politically organized when bringing their case to the court of public opinion and win over hearts and minds.

Without electoral victories by secularists at the ballot, the status quo, in which secularists are losing power, may continue.

Prolonged rule by AKP may translate into a creeping long-term re-Islamization of Turkish society and political system. The outcome of such a transformation may be an Islamic republic that could become hostile to the United States and its allies and a Turkish society that would lose its current political and economic gains.

The United States is Turkey’s friend, and friends do not allow friends to commit political suicide. Turkey is and should remain a key NATO ally for the United States.